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An extensive economic literature exists on the provision of public goods by
the private sector [Bergstrom et Al.., 1986; Andreoni, 1988]. By contrast, the
reverse question of the public provision of private goods was oddly neglected
until recent years, with the exception of some pioneering contributions.
Two di¤erent approaches have been developed to address this question
[Boadway and Marchand, 1995; Blomquist and Christiansen, 1999]. The …rst
is represented by the public choice models, which examine the interaction be-
tween voter demand and the supply of publicly provided private goods. In this
approach, the quantity of publicly provided private goods is determined by the
median voter’s choice and, consequently, taxes are set at the level required to
…nance it. In order to be re-elected, the government is forced to maximise the
median voter’s utility function, since he represents the decisive voter [Meltzer
and Richard, 1981; Usher, 1977; Wilson and Katz, 1983; Pauly, 1992; Gouveia,
1996, 1997; Epple and Romano, 1996a, 1996b; Glomm and Ravikumar, 1998].
The second approach is represented by normative models, which focus on
the e¢ciency enhancing role of publicly provided private goods. According to
this literature, in the presence of distortionary taxes there is a strong case for
the desiderability of in-kind transfers instead of monetary transfers1.
The basic idea of this literature is that publicly provided goods can be used
as a device to select income groups, since the government cannot observe the
individuals’ incomes. If rich individuals prefer to consume higher quality (or
quantity) of a good such as health care, the government can redistribute from
high-income to low-income individuals by providing this good publicly. Publicly
provided private goods of relatively low quality allow the low-income individuals
1For a survey of the literature, see Balestrino (1999).
1to consume these goods for free, while higher income individuals will consume
them in the private market. Boadway and Marchand (1995), Blomquist and
Christiansen (1995, 1998a, 1998b), Cremer and Gahvari (1997), and Boadway,
Marchand and Sato (1998) study public provision of private goods in a two-
type model with self-selection constraints. More recently, Thum and Thum
(1999) examine how redistribution through public provision of private goods can
be extended to the case of repeated interactions between the government and
transfer recipients. However, all these models do not include public provision
of a public good. By contrast, Boadway and Keen (1993) give an excellent
account of public provision of a public good in a two-types model with optimal
non-linear income tax, but their model is still incomplete since it does not
include public provision of a private good.
The purpose of this paper is to generalise this latter approach, by investigat-
ing how the simultaneous provision of both a public good and a publicly pro-
vided private good can improve the e¢ciency of redistribution within a model of
optimal non-linear income taxation with asymmetric information on individual
ability levels.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the
basic model. Section 3 analyses welfare e¤ects of public good provision when
the level of publicly provided private good is given. Section 4 analyses the
opposite case in which the level of public good is given. Section 5 focuses on
the mixed scheme, where both policy instruments are used. Some conclusions
are drawn in Section 6.
22 The basic model
Consider an economy consisting of two types of individuals, characterised by
two di¤erent indexes, w1 and w2; with w2 > w1. The variable wi may be
thought of as the wage rate or as ability, but the analysis is generalisable in
this respect. Information about ability and supplied hours of labour is private
information not available to the government, which can only observe total indi-
vidual income. In this setting, the government cannot impose lump-sum taxes
conditional on ability. Instead a redistribution scheme must be designed subject
to an information constraint in order to prevent high-ability individuals from
mimicking low-ability individuals. This occurs when the more able individuals
masquerade as low-ability ones by earning the same income. In what follows,
I will focus on the ‘normal’ case in which the government redistribution goes
from the high-ability to the low-ability individuals.
In the economy there are four commodities: a private good, x; time spent
on work, l; a pure public good, g; and a mixed good2, z, which is interpreted as
health care. The government provides the same level of the public good, g, to all
individuals, even if they may value it di¤erently. It also provides some amount
of health care, h; uniformly to all individuals. Individuals may supplement it
by purchasing health care in the private market, s, but they are not allowed to
trade some of the publicly provided quantity3, so that z = h +s; with s ¸ 0: I
assume x; g; z; and leisure to be normal goods. Furthermore, the mixed good
and leisure are assumed to be substitutes4, since an increase in leisure implies
2An early de…nition of mixed good is given by Stiglitz (1974): ‘...is a private good (a good
for which there is a substantial marginal cost of an additional person consuming it) which is
provided in equal quantities to all individuals (within a given class)’.
3This assumption is necessary to make an in-kind transfer distinguishable from a transfer
in cash.
4This assumption is equivalent to assuming that the marginal valuation of z is increasing
3a decrease in the demand for z, taking consumer prices and disposable income
as given [Boadway and Marchand, 1995; Boadway et Al.., 1998].
Type i’s before-tax income is Yi = wili: Each type-i individual has the same





with @Ui=@x > 0;@Ui=@l < 0;@Ui=@g > 0; and @Ui=@z > 0.
Each individual maximises utility by choosing x;Y; and s subject to the
budget constraint Y ¡T(Y ) = x+phs; where T(Y ) is a non-linear tax-function5
and ph is the price of health care, while the price of x is normalised to one.
Following Christiansen (1984), I assume that the individual’s problem can
be analysed as a two-stage process. In the …rst stage, he decides his supply of
labour; in the second stage, he allocates his after-tax income between x and
s, conditional on the before-tax income which has been earned by supplying l.
Solving backward, at stage two labour is treated as …xed. Let Bi = Yi ¡ Ti be
the individual i’s after-tax income; by substituting xi = Bi¡phsi in equation




Ui(Bi ¡phsi;Yi;g;si + h) (2)
in labour, @MRSi
xz=@li > 0; where MRSi
xz is the marginal rate of substitution of x for z in
utility function [Blomqvist and Christiansen, 1998].
5The choice of non linear taxation is made to make the self-selection constraint e¤ective.
In fact, in the case of linear income taxation, an e¢cient redistribution is precluded [Wilson,
1991].
4The …rst-order conditionsyield the conditional demand function, si (ph;g;h;Yi;Bi),
which expresses the demand for goods conditional upon the value of li.
A useful property of the conditional demand functions occurs for si > 0; as
shown in Boadway et Al.. (1998): Suppose h is increased when si > 0. The
change in the demand for zi may be broken down into two separate e¤ects: an
income e¤ect and a substitution e¤ect. The income e¤ect makes the individual’s
overall demand for zi increase; by contrast, since h and si are assumed to be









Substituting the conditional demand function for si into the utility func-
tion Ui(:) yields the indirect utility function, which represents type i’s utility
function when his before- and after-tax income is spent optimally:
-i (ph;g;h;Yi;Bi) = Ui [Bi ¡phsi (ph;g;h;Yi;Bi);Yi;g;h + si (ph;g;h;Yi;Bi)]
(4)
This can be represented geometrically by an indi¤erence map in (Bi;Yi)
space, characterised by the single-crossing property, in which low-ability indif-
ference curves are steeper than curves of high-ability individuals.
















where partial derivatives are expressed by appropriate subscripts.
5At the …rst stage of the individual’s maximisation, he has to decide the
supply of hours of labour, or, which is equivalent, the combination of before- and
after-tax income, to maximise (4). In this respect, the government’s choice of a
non-linear tax schedule may be interpreted as the o¤ering of this combination
of before- and after-tax income to individuals.
In what follows, I focus on second-best Pareto-e¢cient solutions, taking the
object of the government to be the maximisation of a social welfare function,
de…ned as the weighted sum of utilities of the two ability types, subject to the
self-selection constraint for high-ability individuals and thegovernment’sbudget
constraint. I consider the case in which redistribution is from high- to low-
ability individuals to the extent that the self-selection constraint is binding. In
order to prevent high-ability individuals from mimicking the before-tax income
of low-ability individuals, a self-selection constraint has been introduced: the
utility of type-two individuals from being honest must be higher than the utility
associated with mimicking. The government’s maximisation problem is de…ned
as:
Max -1(ph;g;h;Y1;B1) + ®-2(ph;g;h;Y2;B2) (6)
subject to:
-2(ph;g;h;Y2;B2) ¸ -m2(ph;g;h;Y1;B1) (7)
n1 [Y1 ¡ B1] +n2 [Y2 ¡ B2] ¸ phh(n1 +n2) + pgg (8)
where ® represents the weight given to the high-level individual’s utility; ni
is the number of type i-individuals; and pg is the price of the pure public good,
which is assumed to be …xed because of the linearity of the technology. The
6superscript ‘m2’ to the respective utility functions identi…es type-two mimicking
individuals.
Three policy instruments are available to the government: a non-linear in-
come tax, a pure public good and a publicly provided private good. Consider
…rst the optimal second best non-linear taxation, which is assumed to be always
in place here afterwards. The Lagrangian for the government’s maximisation
problem may be written as:




±[n1 (Y1 ¡ B1 ¡phh) + n2 (Y2 ¡ B2 ¡phh) ¡ pgg]
(9)
where ¯ and ± are the Lagrangian multipliers respectively associated to the
self-selection constraint and the government’s budget constraint. Di¤erentiating


















y ¡±n2 = 0 (13)
These represent the standard conditions for optimal taxation in the absence
of public goods [Stiglitz, 1982; Boadway and Keen, 1993]. In particular, fol-
lowing Stiglitz (1982), dividing (13) by (12), it follows that the marginal tax
7rate faced by the more able individual is zero and dividing (11) by (10) that
the marginal tax rate faced by the less able individual will be positive6. Hence,
the maximum level of welfare attainable through a non-linear income tax sys-
tem, taking g and h as given, is constrained by self-selection. In this respect,
the use of quantity controls can relax the self-selection constraint and allows
the government to improve the e¢ciency of redistribution as shown in the next
sections.
6See Stiglitz (1982) for a more general analysis of conditions (10)-(13).
83 The welfare e¤ect of the pure public good
Consider the case in which the amount of publicly provided private good is
given. De…ne W (g;h) the maximum value function for the government’s opti-
mal income tax problem. This represents the value of social welfare for a given
amount of g and h. By applying the envelope theorem and using …rst-order









g ¡ ±pg (14)
From which it follows:
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From which it is easy to check for Proposition 1
To get further intuition on Proposition 1, consider the case in which, for a
given value of h, the optimal non-linear income tax and public good policy are
both in place. This means assuming g as a control variable in the government’s
9optimisation problem (9), so that the optimality condition on g implies equation
(15) equal to zero. When this occurs, the Samuelson rule - according to which
the sum of the marginal rate of substitution over all individuals must be equal
to the marginal rate of transformation - is violated whenever the mimicker’s
marginal evaluation of the public good is greater or lower than the low-ability’s
marginal evaluation. In particular, at second best Pareto e¢ciency in the level
of public good provision, constrained by a binding self-selection constraint on
the high-ability individuals, an over-provision/under-provision of public goods
occurs if the sum of marginal rates of substitution of g for x is lower/higher
than the marginal cost7.
Consider …rst the case in which MRS1
gx > MRSm2
gx , that is, at second best
optimum thereisan over-production of g (with respect to the …rst best solution).
Following Boadway and Keen (1993), starting at
P
i MRSi
gx = pg, suppose to
increase g incrementally, and, simultaneously, to increase each individual’s tax
liability by his marginal rate of substitution of g for x: Since the mimicker and
low-ability individuals face the same budget constraint and since MRS1
gx >
MRSm2
gx ; the mimicker is crowded out at a lower value of g than the value at
which low-ability individuals are crowded out. Furthermore, since B2 > B1
and Y2 > Y1, and since
@g
@Bi > 0 and
@g
@Yi > 0; the mimicker is also crowded out
before honest high-ability individuals. The self-selection constraint on high-
ability individuals turns out to be relaxed, so that public good provision is
welfare enhancing.
A similar argument applies for the case in which MRS1
gx < MRSm2
gx : When
this occurs, starting at
P
iMRSi
gx = pg suppose to reduce g incrementally
and, at the same time, to modify the tax structure in such a way that each
7As in Boadway and Keen (1993), the concept of over- and under-provision is merely
‘...shorthand for a central characteristic of the second-best optimum’.
10individual’s tax liability decreases by his marginal rate of substitution of g for
x. Likewise, the mimicker is crowded out before either low-ability and high-
ability individuals.
114 The welfare e¤ect of the publicly provided
private good
Consider now the case in which the amount of public good is given. By applying
the envelope theorem and using …rst-order conditions, after some manipulations







































is the compensated e¤ect on si: From (16) it
follows:
Proposition 2 For any value of g, if z is a substitute for leisure, an increase
in the level of the publicly provided good is welfare enhancing.












































@h = 0 for si > 0; by applying the envelope theorem,
it follows that @W











12Since z is assumed to be a substitute for leisure, if high-ability individuals
mimick low-ability individuals they consume more leisure than low-ability indi-
viduals, and consequently less publicly provided private good, so that it must
be the case that MRS1
zx > MRSm2
2 : Hence, since Um2
x > 0; follows Proposition
2
This result states that if the assumption on the substituability between z
and leisure holds, then additional (with respect to …rst-best optimum) public
provision of a private good can relax the high-ability self-selection constraint.
Analogously to the previous section, here I only consider the case in which a
single policy instrument is used. In so doing, the pure public good is assumed to
be given, at least equal to zero. This assumption is relaxed in the next section,
where the mixed scheme is analysed.
135 The welfare e¤ects of the mixed scheme
In this section I focus on the mixed scheme, that is, the case in which both
a public good and a publicly provided private good are used. To investigate
the implications of such a scheme, consider the case in which they are used
optimally:
Proposition 3 In the case in which both a pure public good and a publicly
provided private good are used optimally, if z is a substitute for leisure, then h
acts as an equal lump-sum transfer to all individuals.
Proof When optimal pure public good provision and optimal provision of
publicly provided good are both in place, the FOCs also include the optimal
condition on the choice of h, so that equation (16) must be equal to zero. By


















Likewise, the optimal condition on the choice of g implies equation (15) be
equal to zero. Solving (15) for
¯
±Um2















Consider …rst the case in which MRSi
gx 6= pg. From Proposition 1 we have
that the …rst term on the LHS of (20) is positive, so that MRS1
zx = MRSm2
zx ,
which corresponds to the case in which neither low- nor high-ability individuals
14nor the mimicker are crowded out, so that h works as an equal lump-sum
transfer to all individuals. Likewise, in the case in which MRSi
gx = pg, that is,
the case in which a …rst best solution occurs for the pure public good provision,
equation (20) implies a …rst best solution for a publicly provided good, thus
concluding the proof
The case of optimal joint provision leaves open the issue of how to redis-
tribute economic resources from the high-ability individuals to the low-ability
individuals, which has been analysed throughout this paper. Starting from the
case of optimal joint provision, suppose to increase h incrementally and, at the
same time, to modify the tax structure in such a way that each individual’s
tax liability increases by his marginal rate of substitution of h for x. Since the
mimicker and low-ability individuals face the same budget constraint and since
MRS1
zx > MRSm2
zx ; the mimicker is crowded out at a lower value of h than
the value at which low-ability individuals are crowded out. Furthermore, since
B2 > B1 and Y2 > Y1, and since @si
@Bi > 0 and @si
@Yi > 0 as long as si is not
crowded out, the mimicker is also crowded out before honest high-ability indi-
viduals. The self-selection constraint on high-ability individuals turns out to be
relaxed, so that publicly provided private good is welfare enhancing. However,
in the special case in which MRSi
gx = pg, if z is a substitute for leisure, then
an increase in h is not welfare enhancing.
156 Conclusions
The two-types model of non-linear income taxation with asymmetric informa-
tion on individual ability levels is extended to discuss welfare e¤ects of two
policy instruments: a pure public good and a publicly provided private good.
The latter is interpreted as health care.
Three di¤erent cases are analysed. When the level of the publicly provided
private good is given, an increase in the level of the pure public good provision
may be welfare enhancing if the low-ability marginal rate of substitution of g
for x is higher than the mimicker’s marginal rate of substitution.
The case in which only the publicly provided private good is considered,
given the assumption that z is a substitute for leisure, implies that an increase
in the level of it is welfare enhancing by relaxing the self-selection constraint on
high-ability individuals.
By contrast, when optimal pure public good provision and optimal provi-
sion of publicly provided good are both in place, this latter acts as a lump-sum
transfer to all individuals. However, it is still possible to redistribute economic
resources from the high-ability individuals to the low-ability individuals by in-
creasing the level of the publicly provided private good as long as an under- or
an over-provision of the pure public good (compared with the …rst best opti-
mum) occurs.
A number of issues remain open for further research. A …rst issue is to allow
for pricing instruments available to the government to be introduced, such as
a per unit subsidy on good z. Following Blomquist and Christiansen (1999), a
second issue would be the attempt to merge the normative approach and the
public choice approach into a single model to derive conditions for an e¢cient
choice of distributional policy within a political economy framework.
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